This paper produces a normative evaluation of …scal rules for a resourcerich economy. Ad hoc …scal rules might imply substantial welfare costs; the goal is to analyze the magnitude of these costs by quantitatively evaluating the relative welfare sub-optimality of these rules. I posit a closed form solution for the in…nite horizon consumption problem of the planner of a resource-rich economy with resource price uncertainty and precautionary saving. The model is subsequently calibrated and simulated to provide a welfare-based comparison between the …scal rules based on the Permanent Income Hypothesis and on the ad hoc Bird-in-Hand policy. The results of the simulation indicate the presence of a positive and substantial welfare loss su¤ered from switching to the Bird-inHand rule. This result is shown to be robust under di¤erent parameterizations.
Introduction
The motivation of this paper is to shed light on a particular aspect of the more general wealth management problem for resource-rich economies, namely, the design of a …scal consumption rule in order to minimize welfare losses from risky resource income. In order to do so, this research produces a normative comparative analysis of …scal rules in a resource-rich economy. Fiscal rules can be either a theoretical derivation or of the ad hoc type. Ad hoc rules might produce sub-optimal welfare results; the aim of this work is to analyze the magnitude of the welfare costs by evaluating the relative welfare optimality of two di¤erent benchmark rules.
The model builds on the analogy between the intertemporal consumption problem of an in…nitely lived representative consumer who receives an uncertain labour income (Caballero, 1990; Bodie, Merton and Samuelson, 1992) and that of a social planner for a country that receives an uncertain income stream from its exhaustible resource stock. The extensive literature on life-cycle saving and permanent income (LC-PIH) started by the seminal work of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) states that a consumer who receives such an income stream will simply spend the return of the present discounted value of his entire wealth. Holding the value of the income (stock) …xed, the actual timing of the income stream ( ‡ow) becomes irrelevant. This suggests that only the amount of the resource wealth might actually matter for the government that is behaving as a permanent income consumer.
Notwithstanding the increased attention to these topics in the literature of natural resource management economics, there is as yet no consensus on how governments of countries with substantial amounts of exhaustible natural resources should design their policies in order to optimally spend their resource revenues. As argued by van der Ploeg (2011), Frankel (2010) and Deacon (2011) in their surveys of the resource curse literature, governments have often overestimated revenues and dangerously relied on the in ‡ated version of their budget constraints (consisting of overall …scal surpluses), thereby incurring sustained budget de…cits which could prove di¢ cult to reverse once income from resources starts to become depleted. In order to avoid this result, some resource-rich countries have implemented more prudent ad hoc …scal rules, in order to reduce discretion in spending rules and, in turn, the associated macroeconomic risks. The applicability of these rules is limited to countries in which domestic political authorities have full control over the resources and, in addition, accountability for rules governing the resources also is ensured. In order to be e¤ec-tive, …scal rules need to be backed by a strong political will and complemented by e¢ cient administration.
Spending behaviours in resource-rich economies have been extensively analyzed at the empirical level. Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy (2010) documented …scal policy behaviour in 31 oil-producing countries during the oil price cycle of 2000 2008. Through decomposition of the non-oil primary government balance into a cyclical and a structural component, they …nd that …scal policy has been pro-cyclical during the boom period and has contributed to the volatility of business cycles. The degree of pro-cyclicality has been high for low-income countries and low for high-income countries. Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy (2010) conducted a sustainability analysis estimating the e¤ects of a sudden drop of the resource price on …scal budgets. They conclude that …nancing these …scal de…cits might constitute a problem for those countries that did not precautionarily accumulate foreign assets and international reserves during the boom period. Gelb and Grasmann (2010) also con…rm empirically the …nding that oil exporters alternate periods of booms with periods of declining GDP as a consequence of price cycles.
Turning to the theoretical literature, Bems and de Carvalho Filho (2011) develop a model with resource price uncertainty in order to compute the magnitude of the precautionary savings motive for a large sample of resource-rich economies. Their model is solved numerically and the results show the positive signi…cance of the precautionary savings motive. Building on the stylized framework for oil-producing small open economies provided by Engel and Valdes (2000) , Maliszewski (2009) has computed numerically the relative welfare gains of di¤erent …scal rules. At …rst, he simulates random realizations of oil price series in order to obtain the paths for government expenditures under the various …scal rules considered. Then, he ranks …scal rules by comparing the values that these expenditure paths imply for the mean of the social welfare function. Another approach is that of Pieschacón (2009) , which analyzes the e¤ects of implementing di¤erent sustainable …scal rules in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a deteriorating oil sector.
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, a closed-form analytical solution for the in…nite horizon consumption problem of the social planner with resource price uncertainty and precautionary savings is presented. This makes it possible to draw clear theoretical implications by avoiding the blackbox e¤ect of numerical analysis. This result is made possible by the speci…c assumption of Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility for the representative agent. In addition, the model is calibrated and simulated to provide a welfare-based comparison between the …scal rules based on the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH, hereafter) and on the ad hoc Bird-in-Hand (BiH, hereafter) policy. The results indicate the presence of a substantial welfare loss su¤ered from switching from the PIH rule to the ad hoc BiH rule. In addition, sensitivity tests prove the robustness of this result under di¤erent parameterizations.
The present model is built as a partial equilibrium framework in the sense that government policy decisions do not in ‡uence the behaviour of private agents in the economy; therefore, several macroeconomic variables will automatically be taken as exogenous. The appreciation of the real exchange rate, the diversion of capital and investment resources from the tradable productive sector into the resource sector and the possibility of rent seeking are all aspects of the economics of natural resources literature which are absent in this work.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, Section 3 and 4 present the PIH and the BiH rules, and Section 5 evaluates welfare under both rules, whilst Section 6 draws the conclusions.
The model
I model the intertemporal consumption problem of a representative agent economy which receives a stochastic resource windfall. In other words, I look at the consumption problem of the planner of an economy which lasts in…nite periods, during which a strictly positive but uncertain exogenous resource income is received. The model is in discrete time. The planner's objective is to choose the optimal level of consumption of the only (public) good in order to maximize the in…nite sum of the agent's discounted utility function 1 . I use oil wealth as an example. The motivation for the utility formulation used in this work comes directly from the microeconomics literature about intertemporal consumption, in which Caballero (1990) and Weil (1993) have shown that, for the intertemporal consumption problem of an agent with labor income uncertainty, a CARA instantaneous utility function makes it possible to obtain an analytical closed form solution with precautionary saving. As previously mentioned, the central role of precautionary saving is also justi…ed by the quantitative results obtained by Bems and de Carvalho Filho (2011) . The utility speci…cation of the model is the following:
where W is the social welfare function to be maximized, represents the intertemporal discount rate parameter, and g t R + is the government expenditure level at date t (i.e., the consumption of the public good). u : R + ! R is the CARA instantaneous utility function, where > 0 is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. In addition to standard assumptions that utility is strictly increasing and that
, we have that u 000 (g) > 0, which means strict convexity of marginal utility. In other words, with higher variability of income, the planner would choose to save more and consume less. I assume absence of non-resource income in the economy, and therefore exclude domestic supply-side and investment opportunities. Distributing only the resource wealth across generations might be 1 As in Barnett and Ossowski (2003) , the in…nitely lived agent set-up can also be thought of as an in…nite sequence of generations of households, each of them living just one period. The choice in the current paper of excluding the possibility of government transfers …nanced by tax revenues from non-resource GDP can then be justi…ed by assuming that these non-resource revenues are only transferred within the generation bearing the speci…c tax burden. motivated by the fact that natural resources, as opposed to domestic non-resource GDP, are indeed an endowment of the whole country's population and not the result of the e¤ort of any speci…c generation of households. Moreover, I consider an economy on its balanced growth path (which constitutes the only realistic option for an in…nite-horizon economy because it implies neither growing nor decreasing consumption paths) in which the domestic interest rate does not deviate from the world interest rate. In a model with non-resource income in which the returns from domestic projects and foreign assets can be di¤erent, domestic investments would provide an alternative diversi…cation channel, in addition to purchasing of foreign assets, for the social planner 2 . The planner's in…nite horizon constrained optimization problem is:
subject to the constraints
Equation (4) represents the government's ‡ow budget constraint. I assume that purchasing foreign …nancial assets A t allows the government to transfer wealth from one period to another. The initial …nancial wealth endowment of the government is A 0 = 0. By saving a fraction of the resource income revenues, the government starts holding foreign assets. Y t is the exhaustible resource income, in other words, the only income source for the government. Because the private sector does not explicitly appear in the maximization problem, the government does not collect taxes. R = (1 + r) is the constant gross interest rate. In addition, I assume that R = 1. In conclusion, the transversality condition (5) guarantees that the government is neither borrowing nor lending in the long run. The next step is to solve forward the ‡ow budget constraint given in (4) in order to obtain the government's intertemporal lifetime budget constraint, creating a link between the present discounted value of consumption and the present discounted value of income (see Mathematical Appendix A.a for details):
This version of the intertemporal budget constraint states that the expected present discounted value of public consumption has to be equal in all periods to the total current public wealth plus the expected present discounted value of future uncertain resource revenues.
Modeling price uncertainty and income
Bems and de Carvalho Filho (2011) have shown that exhaustible resource prices are substantially more volatile than extraction quantities 3 . This empirical evidence motivates the following approach, which abstracts from resource extraction decisions and considers the resource price volatility as the one and only source of uncertainty. For simplicity, I assume oil income for the economy to be given in each period by the quantity of oil sold, X t , evaluated at real spot market prices:
As far as the stock of reserves is concerned, I assume that the peak of oil production has already been reached, and that no further discoveries of new …elds are going to replace the depleting stock. Thus, the stock of oil is inevitably depleting until it vanishes. At that point in time, the model will become fully deterministic because the only source of uncertainty will disappear. I formalize the depletion dynamics of the stock in the following way, where the depletion rate is represented by the exogenous parameter 4 :
Hence, the crucial role in the present model is played by the volatile price component. Before we discuss the empirical literature of resource prices, the time path for the world oil price 1987 2014 (Europe Brent Spot Price) is shown here in Figure An important work in the empirical literature of resource prices is the study by Pindyck (1999) , who builds a model in which oil prices are mean-reverting to a quadratic trend that ‡uctuates over time. The economic intuition behind the mean-reversion property is that, assuming that the resources are sold in a competitive market, their price will sooner or later revert to the long-run marginal cost. However, Pindyck (1999) concludes that, in the case where oil prices would rise substantially in the subsequent decade (which indeed happened, as shown in Figure 1) , the multivariate stochastic process model proposed in his work would have not provided any better predictions than a simple model with mean-reversion to a …xed linear trend. More recently, Rogo¤ and Dvir (2009) argue that a very long-run perspective is necessary to understand the true stochastic process lying behind oil prices, because of the structurally di¤erent statistical behaviour of prices in di¤erent epochs. Hamilton (2009) has conducted a comprehensive statistical investigation of the properties of oil prices. He shows that changes in oil prices have always tended to be permanent, di¢ cult to predict and governed by di¤erent stochastic regimes in di¤erent epochs. In conclusion, he claims that, although forecasts might turn out to be far from actual future values, actual current values provide the best available forecasts. In light of Hamilton (2009)'s result, this model assumes that the price of oil follows a random walk without drift of the following kind:
I formulate the income process as a combination of a trend component represented by the depleting resource stock and a random walk deviation from the trend, represented by the price of oil:
The Permanent Income Policy
Let us proceed to derive the …scal spending rule based on the PIH, in other words, the optimal consumption function of the maximization problem presented in Section 2. The value equation for the problem is given by:
A standard solving procedure with the help of the envelope theorem gives the classic Euler equation for the marginal utilities of consumption (see Appendix A.b for details):
Let us now observe how the introduction of income uncertainty (as a consequence of the resource price uncertainty " t s N (0; 2 " )) triggers the presence of precautionary motives in the optimal consumption rule. The CARA utility speci…cation implies that (12) becomes:
Because the income process has normally distributed innovations, I hypothesize and then verify (see Appendix A.c) that the consumption process will obey the following dynamics:
Based on these dynamics, we need to specify how future consumption levels are predicted. Conditioning the future unknown level of consumption on the current information gives (see A.d.):
This result shows that more volatile resource income will trigger higher expected consumption growth, in other words, a steeper optimal consumption path. This is a consequence of precautionary motives which induce higher current savings in order to o¤set possible future adversities. As a result of this, the government's consumption will be expected to grow faster from one period to another. Now de…ne = log( R)
. In order to proceed with the derivation of the optimal consumption function, we need to obtain the present discounted values to be inserted in the intertemporal budget constraint given by (6) . The expected present discounted value of public consumption is obtained as follows:
Let us now turn to resource income. Given the income process described in (10), we have that (details in Appendix A.e.):
Computing the present discounted value of income gives:
We can now substitute (18) and (20) into (6) to get:
and further solve for the optimal consumption function of the government:
The …rst term on the right-hand side re ‡ects the government's direct consumption of the resource income. The propensity to consume directly out of the resource revenues is lower than unity because part of the resource revenue is invested by purchasing foreign assets. In other words, savings are accumulated in a sovereign wealth fund, especially during periods in which resource income is very high. The second term represents the annuity value of the …nancial wealth, i.e., the government consumes the return on its previously accumulated …nancial wealth. Finally, the last term (obtained by recalling that we assumed R = 1) indicates that uncertain future resource income makes it desirable for the government to precautionarily consume less and save more of its current total wealth. This result implies that, after resources have been depleted, both the direct consumption term r r+ Y t and the precautionary motives term 2r 2 " will disappear from the optimal consumption function; hence, the model becomes deterministic and the PIH rule will be given simply by g t;P IH = r 1+r A pih t . In other words, when oil resources are depleted, the government will …nance its expenditure exclusively by relying on the return on past savings from resources.
However, the formulation in (22) is not yet in reduced form. In fact, the value of the net foreign assets is determined endogenously in the current model and must therefore depend only on the model's initial conditions, as well as on income shocks. Setting = 2r 2 " and inserting the spending rule (22) into the dynamics of the budget constraint given in (4) implies:
Solving this di¤erence equation gives:
Inserting back into equation (22) …nally allows us to obtain a reduced form PIH spending rule, as a function of only exogenous terms:
In general, the intuition behind the PIH spending rule given in (22, 26) is explained as follows. This rule aims by de…nition to maintain a constant stock of wealth over the long run. This implies that the forward-looking government does not simply spend out of current resource and …nancial income, but instead spends out of permanent income or total wealth. In other words, the government optimally chooses a combination of consumption and savings that allows it to equalize the welfare of the agent over her entire lifetime horizon. A simulation of this rule in comparison with the BiH rule will be given in Section 5.
The Bird-in-Hand Policy
As opposed to the theoretical and forward-looking spending rule based on the PIH, a few countries have recently adopted ad hoc …scal rules to govern the use of their resource income. These pragmatic and highly operational rules are intended to reduce the pro-cyclicality of …scal policy and to direct the use of the resource revenues toward long-term sustainability objectives. The BiH rule is supposed to limit the macroeconomic impact of resource revenues by smoothing the spending path of these revenues.
This section presents a stylized formulation of the BiH rule, de…ned as:
The BiH rule prescribes that the entire resource income shall be stored in a sovereign wealth fund. This implies that no intertemporal consumption problem arises for the government. When this rule is adopted, the stochastic process of the oil price becomes a negligible variable because the spending rule will no longer directly react to it. Government consumption will be a¤ected by the oil price shock only indirectly, through changes in accumulated …nancial assets rather than through variations in the present value of resource revenues. What does the rule imply for the dynamics of the budget constraint? Let us go back to equation (4) and substitute in the BiH rule (27) to get:
This tells us that, after resource depletion, the amount of wealth which is saved in the fund stays at a constant level, because the oil income Y t has been entirely depleted:
(the same will occur for the PIH rule because both rules become identical after depletion, net of the di¤erence in accumulated assets). Solving the di¤erence equation obtained in (29) gives:
In turn, this allows us to express the BiH spending rule as a function of only exogenous terms and initial values:
The essence of the BiH rule given in (27, 31) is that it allows consumption exclusive of the resource revenues that already have been liquidated. The BiH rule therefore has a backward-looking nature as opposed to the forward-looking nature of the PIH. In each period, current spending depends only on the size of the sovereign wealth fund in the previous period, implying no direct link with the risky resource income. As stated above, the intention behind this approach is to reduce the impact of resource price volatility on current spending.
Discussion
When is the ad hoc BiH rule preferred over the …scal consumption policy based on the PIH, and when is the reverse true? A possible disadvantage of the PIH rule is that it ignores future expenditure commitments related to population dynamics and ageing. In light of this, does the BiH rule qualify as a more prudent spending rule? As anticipated above, less stylized forms of (27, 31) have recently appeared in several countries. An example of an ad hoc …scal rule with a high degree of …scal conservatism is that of Norway, one of the world largest producers of oil and gas. A concise but detailed presentation of the Norwegian experience with management of its petroleum resources is provided by Holden (2013) .
As early as 1983, the "Tempo Committee" (Tempo Utvalg in Norwegian) recommended establishment of a fund in which oil and gas income could be deposited, in order to detach revenues from myopic public spending. The intention was to focus on the permanent income from resource wealth in order to smooth public government spending and to partly postpone the gains from hydrocarbon revenues to future generations of citizens, as the benchmark PIH rule prescribes. After a decade of debates, in 1996 Norwegian authorities established a sovereign wealth fund in which resource revenues are placed. It is debatable whether the wealth fund was administered according to the prescriptions of the PIH rule in the initial years or whether fully discretionary spending instead took place during that time. The fund is today called the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) and its size was 122% of GDP and 181% of non-resource GDP at the end of 2011 (NBIM, 2013).
In order to also deal with the volatility in present values of resource wealth (due to price volatility), in 2001 Norwegian authorities introduced an ad hoc spending rule based on a …xed level of interest spending, as in (27, 31): roughly 4% per annum of the fund wealth can be used for public consumption (although there are exceptions in case of recessions). Although the establishment of the fund in 1996 was inspired by the PIH, the subsequent adoption of the BiH rule in 2001 makes it possible to consider that the Norwegian spending rule incorporates features of both the PIH and the BiH spending rules. By estimating Norway's …scal reaction functions based on historical data, Harding and Van der Ploeg (2013) test this hypothesis and indeed con…rm that Norwegian …scal behaviour can be regarded as somewhere in between the two benchmark rules. However, it should not be taken for granted that the Norwegian spending rule will accommodate unexpected …scal commitments in the long run. Harding and Van der Ploeg (2009, 2013) have also argued that neither the actual Norwegian spending rule nor the pure PIH-BiH benchmark rules will determine a level of foreign assets accumulation high enough to face the increasing future burden coming from the ageing population and related rising pension commitments (unless …scal expenditure is tightened or the pension system reformed) 5 .
Another interesting example is that of Chile, as mentioned in Frankel (2010) . Chile managed to have a counter-cyclical …scal policy due to a structural balance rule which allowed the government to run de…cits larger than the target only in case of deep recessions and the price of the resource (copper) being lower than expected. The structural balance rule factors out the cyclical and random e¤ects of GDP and of the copper price. The cyclical adjustment to the copper price is based on the gap between the actual export price and an estimated long-term moving average reference price.
The evaluation of …scal rules
Let us proceed with the evaluation of …scal rules. Cochrane (1989) pioneered the study of the utility costs of alternative decision rules. He pointed out that consumption patterns that deviate from the optimal permanent income consumption rules, but incur only in trivial utility costs, can be labeled as near-rational. In the current work, however, the two …scal rules cannot be simply considered as deviations from each other.
The simplest approach to conduct a welfare comparison between the two …scal rules would be to investigate the magnitude of the utility gap that would make the representative agent at least as well o¤ under one …scal rule as under the other. Lucas (2003) used a similar approach to identify the welfare gain from fully eliminating income uncertainty for a risk-averse consumer. In other words, when it comes to comparing two di¤erent rules, a …scal rule would be logically preferred over the other if its contingency plan for consumption and asset accumulation yields a higher level of expected conditional welfare. Because the PIH benchmark represents the optimal rule under the model's assumptions, the welfare measure in terms of consumption, which measures the cost of switching to the BiH rule, will have to be positive. The question is whether this welfare gap is substantial and robust to di¤erent parameterizations.
Calibration and simulation
This subsection calibrates and simulates 6 a …nite horizon version of the model using a few parameters and initial values for one generic oil exporting country, somewhat increase in future spending commitments. 6 The MATLAB code used for the simulation and the comparison of …scal rules is available from the author on request.
resembling the economic pro…le of Norway 7 . The model is simulated for T = 200 periods, with one period assumed to be equivalent to one year. In the baseline simulation, the real rate of return is assumed to be r = 0:04 (therefore, the subjective discount rate is = 1=1:04), whilst the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion is set at = 0:05 8 . The initial foreign assets level is set at A 0 = 0 without loss of generality. The amount of proven exhaustible oil reserves for Norway was estimated to be 8:7 billion barrels at the end of 2013 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014). The depletion rate is set at = 0:03, and the lifetime of oil reserves has been arbitrarily set at 100 years. The initial value for the real price of oil has been set at the European Brent spot price for January 2014, which was approximately $100 per barrel (EIA 2014). The rest of the oil price series is simulated according to (10) . The variance for the price series has been initially set at 2 " = 30. Figure 2 below shows a (single) random realization of the price, stock and resource income dynamics: 7 Although the goal of the actual Norwegian spending rule is to smooth the combination of both domestic and resource income, in the current framework I abstract from the former, as explained in Section 2. This implies that the formulation of the BiH rule employed in this simulation is no more than a stylized form of the actual Norwegian spending rule. The rationale behind the two rules remains the same, however: trying to reduce uncertainty from resource depletion and income volatility in order to spread the bene…ts equally through generations and face future unexpected …scal commitments. 8 A discussion of the range of possible Coe¢ cients of Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) is provided by Babcock et al. (1993) . The simulated series for the resource price, stock of resources, and resource revenues determine the consumption and asset accumulation prospects under the two …scal rules in Figure 3 , below. As anticipated in the previous sections, the PIH based rule (solid line) implies that a fraction of the resource revenues is accumulated in a fund; subsequently, its capital income is used to sustain the consumption of the representative agent after resource depletion. Therefore, the consumption series for this rule will look substantially ‡at, with only limited perturbations due to price volatility in the pre-depletion era, as can be seen in the upper series plotted in Figure  3 : The BiH rule (dashed line) implies instead a steeper asset accumulation path by prescribing that the entire resource income must be invested in foreign assets. As the bottom plot of Figure 3 clearly shows, the volume of assets accumulated in the fund turns out to be higher for the BiH rule throughout the time range of the simulation. The faster pace of foreign asset accumulation determines an initial lower consumption level for the BiH rule compared to the PIH. However, due to the higher amount of …nancial assets accumulated before depletion (for t 100), the BiH rule allows achievement of a sustained higher level of public consumption after depletion (for 100 < t T ). Notice that, after depletion, the two rules coincide and the consumption gap between them stays constant.
Comparing the …scal rules
Let us now quantitatively evaluate the welfare pro…les implied by the two …scal rules. The …rst step is to de…ne a constant welfare measure in terms of consumption for each of the two …scal rules, a role that can be played by the so-called Certainty Equivalent. The Certainty Equivalent represents the values of constant consumption that generate exactly the same utility as does the consumption series from each …scal rule. This implies that the …scal rule with the greatest expected utility will also have the preferable Certainty Equivalent. Once the Certainty Equivalent measures CE BIH and CE P IH have been computed, the second and …nal step will be to estimate the gap between the two …scal rules in terms of consumption.
De…ne CE BIH and CE P IH , respectively, such that:
The Certainty Equivalent consumption levels CE BIH and CE P IH , respectively, are given by:
with
. By using the consumption levels CE BIH and CE P IH , we can now proceed to estimate the value of the welfare measure , expressing the constant change in Certainty Equivalent consumption necessary for the BiH rule to generate the same level of utility as the PIH rule:
The baseline simulation (T = 200; = 0:05; r = 0:04; = 0:03; 2 " = 30) estimates that = 4:7092, con…rming the theoretical model's prediction that the rule based on the PIH provides a substantially higher welfare level for the representative agent of our economy. In other words, the jump in Certainty Equivalent consumption necessary for the BiH rule to generate the same level of utility as the PIH rule is estimated in the baseline simulation to be approximately 4:7092 times the level expressed by the CE BIH . Now, let us conduct a sensitivity analysis to investigate how the result for varies with respect to changes in the baseline parameters ( ; r; ; 2 " ). In order to focus on the comparative static e¤ects, variation will be allowed for one parameter at a time 9 . The interest rate, for example, will be 0:02 < r < 0:08; the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, 0:02 < < 0:08; the depletion rate, 0:03 < < 0:1; and the variance of the resource price, 20 < Figure 4 , in which varies with respect to changes in the CARA parameter . The series shows a clear increasing tendency for the welfare measure in terms of Certainty Equivalent consumption ; in response to a higher degree of risk aversion . Recall from (22) that a higher implies stronger precautionary motives and thereby a more prudent consumption path for the PIH rule. This prediction is con…rmed by observing that, from a level of CE P IH = 437:85 for = 0:02, the Certainty Equivalent consumption linearly decreases to CE P IH = 283:92 for = 0:08. In addition, the impact of a higher on the BiH rule determines an even stronger fall in the Certainty Equivalent consumption than is the case for the PIH rule, mostly due to the higher variability in the consumption series of the BiH rule. Speci…cally, from a level of CE BIH = 129:21 for = 0:02, the Certainty Equivalent consumption decreases to CE BIH = 39:95 for = 0:08. In other words, the e¤ect of a higher CARA parameter on , through CE BIH and CE P IH jointly, turns to be positive and mostly linear, as shown in the upper left part of Figure 4 .
Notice now that, from the formulation of the model in the previous sections, no straightforward conclusion can be drawn as regards the e¤ects of a higher interest rate r on , the estimate of the welfare gap between the two …scal rules. On one side, an increase in the interest rate r increases the return from investing the resource income into …nancial assets, ceteris paribus, for both …scal rules . As is clear from the lowest plot of Figure 3 , which shows the di¤erent paths of assets accumulation, this gives the BiH rule the advantage over the PIH rule, apparently reducing the overall welfare gap between them. On the other side, (22, 26) predict that a higher interest rate translates into a higher share of the resource income being directly consumed and thereby higher consumption levels for the PIH rule, apparently increasing the welfare gap between the two rules. The lower left part of Figure 4 , in which increases with respect to higher levels of r 10 , shows that the latter e¤ect of boosted consumption under the PIH rule plays a stronger role and determines on aggregate an increasing welfare gap between the two …scal rules.
Let us focus now on how the results react in response to changes in the resource depletion parameter . A higher implies a faster rate of depletion, although the total lifetime of oil reserves stays constant at 100 years. In other words, resource income decreases faster than is observed in the bottom plot of Figure 2 for a higher rate of depletion , becoming negligible in the last years before depletion. The qualitative intuition goes as follows: the BiH rule, which prescribes faster accumulation of …nancial assets and postpones consumption, would be less penalized by the increased depletion rate. This prediction is con…rmed by observing that the Certainty Equivalent consumption drops from a level of CE P IH = 352:72 for = 0:03, to CE P IH = 229:98 for = 0:1; whilst CE BIH slightly decreases from CE BIH = 61:40 for = 0:03 to CE BIH = 61:27 for = 0:1. Consequently, the upper right part of Figure 4 shows that the measure of the welfare gap shrinks when a positive shift occurs for the resource depletion rate .
Last but not least, let us analyze the sensitivity of the results with respect to the resource price uncertainty 2 " . On the one hand, the model of the current paper prescribes that higher volatility of resource income translates into stronger precautionary savings and thereby a lower consumption level under the PIH rule. On the other hand, as is shown in (27, 31), the ad hoc BiH rule does not directly react to changes in income volatility, although increased volatility gives higher consumption volatility under this rule as well. In other words, the theoretical prediction of the model is that of a lower welfare gap between the two …scal rules for higher levels of To sum up, the evidence and results presented throughout this subsection and in Figure 4 show that the gap between the two …scal rules estimated by the welfare measure in terms of consumption, , is substantial and robust to variation in the di¤erent parameters. This con…rms the intuition that, under the given calibration of the model of this paper, the BiH policy rule quali…es as the less preferred option in order to maximize the welfare of the representative agent of our economy.
Concluding remarks
The background motivation of this research was to focus on a particular aspect of the wealth management problem for governments of resource-rich economies. Resource wealth gives rise to uncertain income paths, creating the need to design …scal consumption rules that minimize welfare losses. In order to expand the literature on the economics of natural resource management, this paper constructed a simple model of an economy endowed with a stochastic income from exhaustible natural resources. The stylized features of the speci…ed model do not allow us to provide straightforward policy recommendations, because country-speci…c parameters often play a crucial role in determining the design of spending policies. However, the results provide a clear understanding of the mechanisms and properties of the two alternative …scal rules under observation.
Speci…cally, I assumed that the planner of the economy decides to spend present and future resource income according to two benchmark …scal rules -one rule derived from the planner's in…nite horizon intertemporal consumption problem (PIH) and the other an ad hoc rule (BiH). An additional contribution of the paper is to quantitatively evaluate the relative welfare-based optimality of these rules. After derivation of the closed-form spending rules for both the maximization-based PIH and the alternative ad hoc BiH policy, the model was calibrated and simulated in order to obtain random time series for the resource price, income dynamics and consumption series.
The last step was to evaluate the welfare performance of the …scal rules by computing a welfare measure in terms of consumption for each of them, namely the Certainty Equivalent. Based on these measures, the results indicate the presence of a substantial welfare loss su¤ered from switching from the PIH rule to the ad hoc BiH rule. In addition, sensitivity tests have proven the robustness of this result under di¤erent parameterizations.
More generally, this paper demonstrates that applying a life-cycle perspective to the public management of natural resource revenues can yield new insights. This paper focused speci…cally on one question related to the management of resource wealth, i.e., the optimal time pro…le for consumption of uncertain resource income. Additional research is therefore required in related aspects of how wealth management policies should be time-varying depending on di¤erent resource depletion paths and on the portfolio allocation of savings from resource income.
A Mathematical Appendix (a) From (4) to (6):
A t+1 = (A t + Y t g t )(1 + r); t = 0; 1; 2:::::;
A t = g t Y t + A t+1 1 + r ;
Substituting this last equation back into the previous and repeating the exercise forward gives:
A t+2 (1 + r) 2 = g t+2 Y t+2
(1 + r) 2 + A t+3 (1 + r) 3 ;
(40)
A t = 
Applying the transversality condition (5), we can rewrite this for the public expenditure term: 
This budget constraint should hold exactly for all future dates s. Thus it should hold in expectation terms at time t:
which is the government's intertemporal lifetime budget constraint as of (6).
(b) The …rst order condition of the Bellman equation given in (11) is given by
Di¤erentiating the Bellman equation and using the Envelope Theorem gives:
Equating to each other (46) and (48) (this result will hold at any date) gives
Substituting again (48) at t + 1 in (46) gives the Euler equation, describing optimization behaviour over time:
(c) The "guess" on the consumption dynamics is:
B Figures
Figures 5 a-b-c-d plot the "correlation check" for each of the varying parameters ( ; r; ; 
